The discourse on tolerance began over two centuries ago and yet is still unfinished. Was Voltaire in 1763 with his "Treatise on Tolerance", condemned religious intolerance persuaded by religious fanaticism of the judgment of the Court of Toulouse. Although the idea of tolerance was born in Europe, it saw and still sees intolerance. Intolerance of yesterday reminds us wars, inquisitions and crusades, instead the modern Europe shows that even between globalization and multiculturalism often proves incapable of "import" different cultures
Introduction
The word tolerance comes from the Latin "tolus" meaning "weight", and unlike as it might seem at first glance, indicates a negative attitude. Visentini affirms that tolerance is generated not only by mutual respect but it is a technique of coexistence for "cohabit" consensus in diversity and that "the foundation of free societies is the principle of tolerance" 2 . It must be regarded as an absolute and universal value, that does not generate even relativism of values, but it looks "as the ethics of coexistence consensual" 
From tolerance to the secular State
In the Italian legal experience the principle of tolerance has been for many years a condition for the non-Catholic religions 4 . The Albertine Statute of 1848 states in the art. 1 that "The Catholic religion, Apostolic and Roman is the only State Religion. The other religions now existing are tolerated under the laws."
So that the Apostolic Roman religion becomes a constitutional institution 5 or better constitutionally guaranteed.
The "social contract" 6 did not guarantee equality of treatment between the Catholic religion and other religions simply tolerated. But it was the first step to transform a State that simply tolerated to a secular State.
However, can not be disputed that, from the point of view of history "tolerance has often formed the necessary antecedent, or at least a useful preparatory element and prodromal" 7 in the foundation of religious freedoms. In the statutory charter cults before non-Catholics were only tolerated 8 and then, at a later time, formally admitted
9
.
Despite the wording of discriminatory article 1 of the Statute and the imprint confessional of the Italian State, the ordinary legislation signaled a strong secularism against minority faiths merely tolerated. But it was the policy of Cavour which marked an important stage in the process of secularization, followed by the Casati laws in 1859 that reformed the educational system by removing the monopoly structures religious education.
Even the laws of "subversion" of 1866 11 and 1867, had an enormous importance to the secularization of Italian society 12 
.
This whole situation resulted as a form of "jurisdictionalism attenuated"
13 although "not suppressed any religious Order and no religious Order disappeared as a result." 14 With the Law of Guarantees (1871), the liberal State was forced to unilaterally regulate the relations with the Church. In particular, it stated in article 2, 4° that "The discussion on religious matters is fully free." It thus marks an important step towards secularism.
A few years later in 1877 was enacted the Coppino law, strongly criticized by Catholics for his cutting secular because made so optional the teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools and removed the theological subjects in universities.
But the real equalization (under criminal profiles) of all cults came with the new penal code Zanardelli 1889.
It unified the legislation in criminal matters throughout the Kingdom, in articles 140-142, marking a turning liberal. In these articles tolerance was not mentioned in the Statute and as we understand from formulation a breath of non-discrimination that equal all cults admitted to the State, that is not favored one religion or another.
In reality, the criminal law was against the statute that excluded the equalization in legal terms. That is to say, the article 1 of the Statute was "implicitly repealed by the Code of 1889"
15
, quietly transforming the italian State from a State that simply tolerate in a State of law.
16
So the italian legislature through the protection offense that could result in any cult 17 , has been able to adapt the law to the needs of the social context, in fact transforming Italy, although only half as claimed doctrine in those years, in a secular State.
In any case, the road that was following was the one that led to a full and secular and the article 1 was considered "unhappy and false in itself, as illiberal and false concept that expresses" 18 . So, cautiously, italian ordinament went to empty his confessionalism, weakening therefore the content now formal of article 1 of the Statute.
Even thought years later Italy comes as a fully secular State 19 , but despite all these legislative initiatives engraved on the liberal model, it was impossible to suppress the religious sentiment rooted for centuries in the italian catholic society
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Then at the beginning of the '900 we see a return to confessionalism State, a return to the "tolerance" but this time in terms of "admissibility". This is the period of the Lateran Pacts, which interrupts the process of secularization of the liberal State and give life again of the article 1 of the Statute
21
, so of the principle of tolerance.
But tolerance is conceptually distant from the right to religious freedom. Until the proclamation of the Charter did not exist in the italian sorting an explicit rule that guaranteed citizens the freedom in religious matters, thus leaving a void for years the spheres of fundamental rights.
In those years there has been talk in terms of the admissibility of Worship other than Catholic, and the law n. 1159/1929 with article 1 sanctioned a true principle of admissibility 24 , providing that "Are allowed in the State cults other than the Catholic Apostolic and Roman, provided they do not profess principles and not follow rites contrary to public order and morality. The exercise, even in public, of these cults is free." This period is characterized by a kind of discrimination against minority religions, many authors have spoken in terms of persecution. Since the admission evaluation of a cult belonged to the public power, this situation often entailed restrictions and limitations. We may recall here Worship Pentecostal or Protestant.
A further discrimination, it appears with the entry into force in 1930 of the Rocco Penal Code which in the articles 402, 405 outlined a specific protection for the Catholic religion. In other words, the punishment was considered a lesser if offense or the disturbance was not directed against to the Catholic but to an admitted cult 25 .
Surely the entry into force of the Lateran Pacts revived the article 1 of the Statute outlining the features of a State tolerant of other faiths.
It was the task of the new Constitution outlining the principles of a State not only secular but also pluralistic, and indeed, "was the pluralism that transformed the principle of tolerance in that of religious freedom" 26 . And religious freedom finds its guarantee only in a secular and non-confessional State.
A few years after the entry into force of the Constitution, Jemolo which had held that the Constitution could not "renounce the postulate of religious freedom" 27 , but he strongly criticized the Constitution and declare that it's outlined foundations of a State neither "secular" neither "confessional"
28
. 24 In these terms also C. Cardia, Libertà di credenza, p. 3. 25 Today this view certainly seems anachronistic. The elimination of privileges has led to a division in the doctrine, some argue that the protection of the religious phenomenon does not even exist because incompatible with the principle of State secularism. Instead the other hand argues that complies with the Constitution and it is the duty of the State to protect the religious sentiment. 26 29 But tolerance is now being understood as a negative concept, from the legal point of view, for this reason, "the different" is no longer tolerated but protected, because according to the principle of equality provided for in article 3 of the Constitution which provides that all citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law without distinction of religion 
The identification of secularism

The principle of the secular State is not expressly enshrined in the italian Constitution as in other constitutions, as in that of Russia or the Turkish and in the European Union only France makes express provisions in its Constitution
32
.
In Italy this principle states notoriously in case law, in particular is defined in the rulings of the Constitutional Court, as a "superprincipio" means "supreme principle of the constitutional order." 34 with which the Consulta ruled claiming the existence of unchangeable principles in their existence that it calls "fundamental principles and inalienable rights" 35 .
The principle of State secularism is included so in the absolutely mandatory, by the same constitutional legislator, constitutional values. Not even rebuttable and editable in its essential content. So although not expressly mentioned among those not subject to the procedure for constitutional amendment, the principle of secularism is "the essence of supreme values in which is based the italian Constitution" (Constitutional Court, Judgment no. 1146 of 1988). Not modifiable always less than a regime change It also ruled that judgment in 1989 that the supreme principles of the constitutional order have "a higher value than the other rules or laws of constitutional rank, even when considered that the provisions of the Concordat, which enjoy the particular 33 The judgments of the Court are an important contribution that helped to define the secular character of the State. But the point of reference were definitely the constitutional provisions as the articles 2, 3, 7, paragraph 1, and articles 8, 19, 20 which are the basis for the reconstruction of secularism. Without forgetting that secularism in itself is the reference point for the reconstruction of a free and egalitarian.
The judgment n. 203 clarified consequently also the position into the order of Concordat provisions, which does not avoid and are subject to the control of constitutionality concerning not only the basic principle but also the inalienable rights of the human person 40 .
The principles contained in this judgment will prove significant not only for the breakthrough but also for the impact that it will have later in the area of freedom of religion.
"The State is secular, word of the Court," writes Barile
41
, and so goes to "a system of ecclesiastical law finally (…) more coherent with the constitutional framework." 42 Musselli contrary criticized the Court's decision, holding that it did not set a secular State, indifferent or agnostic, nor a State or anticlerical neo-giurisdizionalis but simply a neutral State in religious matters 43 . Even the phrase "non-indifference of the State before the religion" has sparked debate in doctrine, which has recognized in it the positive secularism expression often considered no different from "healthy secularism"
44
, and from this perspective it is believed that the consequence is the recognition of the favor religionis of Republican Charter.
But the expression of the Court "non-indifference" does not seem sufficient to indicate the favor religionis, moreover this formula can not -and will not must-read alone, and 
Conclusions
Secularism is a core value of a democratic Republic, whose purpose is to bring together atheists and believers without privilege or discrimination 45 .
And undoubtedly secularism as extrapolated by the italian Constitution makes us understand that the Constitution becomes a container of values, sometimes expressed explicitly and sometimes not.
Thus secularism is a necessary value and indispensable to manage diversity. In a perspective where society has changed profoundly, modernism and globalization have contaminated cultures 46 and made complex and delicate coexistence in a plural society, the solution is the awareness that their proper ideas are not the only, and it is unreasonable to impose 47 
.
Because the layman as emphasized Scarpelli is not "the denier of God" but "who think out of the hypothesis of God, accepting the absolute limits of existence and of human consciousness" 48 . Considered this it is clear that the task of the State and of modern Constitutions, as Rawls deems, is to ensure full autonomy to man.
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